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Vol. 11, Num. 1, 2009
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Institutional Restrictions on Scientific Productivity: The Case Study of a Mexican Public University
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Ana Isabel Metlich Medlich
ametlich@uaslp.mx
Formación de Profesores y Educación Continua Secretaría Académica
Universidad de San Luis Potosí
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Alvaro Obregón No. 64 Centro San Luis Potosí, San Luis Potosí, México
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(Received: April 23, 2007;
accepted for publishing: July 17, 2008)
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Abstract
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Identifying factors which restrict research is not only important for universities but for their professors. In this paper different aspects are researched and identified, which may influence scientific productivity. As a basis for this paper 48 interviews were conducted with researchers from a State Public University. These researchers were chosen including those from the highest level in the National System of Researchers (of Mexico), SNI for its acronym in Spanish Sistema Nacional de Investigadores, to those who have not yet entered it. The results sustain that professors have been submitted to requirements that hinder the development of their multiple tasks, among those stand out: produce knowledge, teach, and tutor students, follow internal and surrounding policies.
Key words: Faculty publishing, academic teaching personnel, colleges, organization.
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Introduction
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It is important to study scientific productivity because a lot of members in the faculty at higher education institutions are assessed in this manner. The productivity doesn’t just go beyond their knowledge within their professional fields, but it also helps to share their results with other researchers who have published on the same topic around the world. Their research brings them presence and prestige, as well as the institutions to which they are affiliated; therefore, they attract recognition, economic support and applications by some of the most qualified graduate students. Its importance is such that the productivity of the research not only incurs in the assessment of academics but also of the institutions, the academic programs, hiring, extraordinary funding and salary decisions.
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I . Method
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This research falls into the tradition of qualitative research. The objective is to understand the processes or mechanisms by which the found variables relate (Silverman, 1993). But, particularly because the approach to the problem of the research is more consistent with the qualitative analysis, its analysis and interpretation can be classified within the comprehensive and interpretive perspective. That is to say, choosing a research method is determined by the interest of the research.
To respond the objective proposed, the following data was collected:
- Documents that would allow an understanding of the organization, its changes, structure and performance.
- Interviews of the directors, researchers and support staff, in order to know who works directly and which have been their restrictions and achievements in the academic productivity scope.
Through the interview the significance of the others can be accessed. The intention of its use is to understand a process, by speaking to people involved. Alvarez-Gayou (2004) mentions that the interview’s objective is to understand the world from the perspective of the interviewee, and to analyze the meanings of their experiences. At the Public University where this research was conducted, 48 researchers were interviewed (in June, 2004). Researchers were chosen from those registered at the National System of Researchers (SNI1 for its acronym in Spanish), as well as those who were not yet in it, and the researchers who held also other positions, since their approach and perception in the activity of the research would be different.
The interviews were designed under the format of semi structuralized interviews (See Annex). According to Ginnell (as cited in Hernandez Sampieri, Fernandez and Baptista, 2003), these type of interviews are based on a guide of statements or questions, and the interviewer has the freedom to incorporate additional questions so as to precise concepts or obtain more information from a desired topic.
The analysis techniques correspond to the diversity of tools used in data gathering. In this study, research began with a classification based on the analysis and interpretation of contents; both techniques are used in a software for textual qualitative data analysis ATLAS/ti 4.1 version.
The analysis was done through conventional procedures like discourse analysis. The process involved categorizing the contents of data, this is, they were identified and categories were constructed from the identification of the topics and relevant subtopics, from their connections and the Organizational Theory. At this point, it’s important to highlight some of the variables, for example:
- Rules or restrictions perceived by the members of the institutions. At this level, the set of guidelines or specific regulations that are generated not only by the surroundings (science and technology policies, SNI regulations, rules for financing), but by the institution itself (regulations, assessment, stimuli regulations, guidelines for being promoted, among others.) are considered.
- Science and technology policies. These set the guidelines to finance science and technology projects. In general, these policies seek to promote and strengthen this activity.
- SNI. Stimulates science and technology activity through grants awarded to researchers, according to their level of production.
- Teaching regulations, in designations, economic support , appraisals, PROMEP2 (for its acronym in Spanish Program for Improving Higher Education Professors) and available resources, both human and material. These seek to regulate the operation of the institution for the better achievement of the institution’s objectives.
- Conflicts. They are the crisis perceived by researchers themselves. They define them as: threats, constraints, difficulties, problems, quarrels, competitions, deceptions and worries ; aligned to those is job certainty, which although it is set on regulations, it creates a crisis in the very researcher, because it means managing time for teaching, research, tutoring, administrative tasks, among others. The resources based on regulations, by being scarce they also urge the researcher to seek and obtain them. On the other hand, rules imposed by the institution as multidisciplinary, constrain researchers when they have to work on projects this way.
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II. Results
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2.1 Restrictions
According to Scott (1998), institutional structures define the ends and develop the means by which they are determined and seek their objectives. In this way, the approved means are established and the desired results are defined; when doing business men seek profits as professors strive to publish their works.
The rules are the restrictions that direct human conduct. They define what should and should not be done. Based on them, alternative possibilities are generated to achieve objectives, and when human conduct is restricted they limit the alternatives. The policies are plans that incorporate general guidelines to lead administrative thinking in specific directions. As a result, the administration is guided towards the implementation of actions consistent with the achievement of the objectives.
Researchers mention that the generation of knowledge is a necessity, but it is expensive: a budget must be set, there is a need for the availability of economic resources enough to carry it out properly, even for publishing. Their performance is affected by the reduction of funding. It is argued that there should be a real support that benefits the country. They are concerned about the tendency on the reduction of resources, bureaucratization, and their distribution (polarization) in certain research areas, as well as about a growing competition among researchers to obtain financing.
The interviewees argue that science and technology policies were issued with lack of knowledge and comprehension by the Mexican Federal Government to really support research as an instrument to foster the country’s development. A proof of it is the low percentage destined to science and technology, which represents 0.4% of GDP for all Mexico, according to the National Council of Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología [CONACYT], 2005). Researchers perceive that there is uncertainty about the future of research in Mexico, and they are upset about the performance of those who are responsible for policies; they also perceive centralization, inability and subordination of research to the private sector, as well as the privilege of technologic development on science and basic research, and the sensation of the destruction of what had been constructed.
They mention that directors make decisions without knowing what the research is really about and the future needs. They indicate that there is not a clear definition of research, as far as its policies, rules, planning and development are concerned. They affect or restrict the policies issued by CONACYT because according to the support that organization grants to researchers, they will have more or less productivity, they will equip their laboratories and students will have more or less income to keep working on their thesis projects.
They also highlight the SNI regulations issued to encourage scientific output. Even when the most of the researchers interviewed belonged to this system their perception of the mechanism implies several problems. Among the most important ones are: the way the system functions and that it does not consider disciplinary differences. Within the area of natural and exact sciences; for example, operating modes, research requirements and the maturity times diverge considerably. For instance, the highest level physicist can generate, with optimal conditions, up to 10 yearly articles in peer reviewed journals. If he is a theoretical physicist his equipment requirements are lower than those of an experimental physicist. But if the case of a biotechnologist is analyzed, the cost of reagents for experimentation is very high, and the time of the experimentation also; thus, if funds are not obtained in time, then activities are stopped. Likewise, the number of articles will be lower, about two a year. These differences are not considered within the system and are highly important at the moment of assessing productivity. In this sense, it is considered that the SNI is an extremely rigid mechanism that has come to commercialize research.
Another issue, identified by the SNI members of a higher level (III) is that the evaluation committees are highly centralized, which give little opportunity to other researchers from other states to get involved. This also becomes a vicious cycle, because the dynamics and conditions in which research is developed at the public universities of the country are unknown, as well as the regional issues that often require of a multidisciplinary approach. The option the organism offers is abide the rules or “get off the boat”.
Even when it is considered crucial to improve researchers’ salary conditions, it is recognized that the system presents lots of dead end streets. For example, there is no way to encourage young groups so as to incorporate them in more productive groups (Diaz, Arechavala and Metlich, 2004).
Within the institution there are also stimuli. Policies and governmental programs in higher education favor the close link between planning, evaluations and financing: this rewards professors’ academic performance through diverse programs that support salaries (Ibarra, 1996). These stimuli functions as a salary complementation.
In Mexico, unlike what happens in other countries, the composition of fixed and variable incomes (legal salary vs. stimulus and scholarships) is opposite to that in other countries, and represents a ratio of up to 30% versus 70%, respectively. Under these conditions, economic uncertainty and stress take professors to speculate and possible abuse (Ibarra, 2000). This means that the professor, because of his relatively low income, has to complement it with other kind of economic support, like scholarships and stimuli that are granted extraordinarily, this causes among researchers a desperate search for obtaining the necessary economic resources to get better income. An example of these regulations can be read in detail in Luis Porter’s (2003) book: La Universidad de papel.
One of the governmental programs that researchers mention is that of the grants for performance. In this program, SEP (for its acronym in Spanish Secretaría en Educación Pública) provides the university with resources which the university manages. This leads to a major centralization of resource management, allowing, in turn, high discretion in the exercise and assignment of resources on the one hand. On the other, it gives some freedom to work depending on institutional priorities.
Stimuli involve faculty motivation to satisfy higher standards in productivity. In the interviews, a researchers’ concern is perceived related to salary increase, as well as criteria to evaluate stimuli which they consider should be less rigid (so researchers can participate in more academic programs), in order they can be certain about stimuli. They mention that there is uncertainty about the resources assignment, there isn’t certainty that their work will have the same remuneration or the recognition as in other universities.
Researchers also refer to unclear rules, there exists ambiguity and rigid criteria that are not consistent with the flexibility that the research requires, and even contradictions exist among the diverse regulations. It should be noted that the general Organic Statute was approved in 1983, and the Faculty Regulations in 1984, even though there have been subsequent reforms since then, there have not been any for designations nor for research; thus, researchers claim obsolescence. The research developed at the university (where the present study was carried out) about 20 years ago was confined to the area of physics and the institutes exclusively (Perez, 2001). However, the institution updated because of the demands of the global context; nevertheless, its regulations have not changed according to said demands. Current research needs must be recognized so that collective decision making is favored.
It is argued that in many of the administrative departments, especially in those in charge of buying, exists bureaucracy, slowness, rigidity of procedures and expense reporting. Researchers find that the administration prevents them from dedicating to research; therefore, the administrators do not support the research and they become obstacles. Also, the process for acquisition of equipment and the paperwork for economic resources are bureaucratic and inefficient, which prevents them form having their results ready assessment. It is argued that there is a surplus in the administrative work load and that it would be convenient to balance the different functions; besides, if a project is approved by CONACYT the administrative work becomes more complicated.
2.2 Organizational Behavior
The organizational behavior draws on personal characteristics and the relationships of individuals; this is its great distinction from the organizational structure. Whatever the formal position in the organization is, social groups share characteristics among them. The social relationships of individuals can adapt and survive in particular circumstances. Participants within a formal organization generate informal regulations and behavioral patterns: status and power systems, communications networks, sociometric structures3 and work groups (Scott, 1998). From here research groups derive, which are made up of researchers that meet informally to discuss a topic, to perform a project in collaboration; because individually they would not have the equipment, the ideas, the discipline and therefore, they cannot have an extensive discussion and debate on a research topic.
The researchers mention that the research groups have the advantage of being able to distribute tasks among the members, both on an ongoing research, as well as on administrative and teaching work. The group can obtain greater funding from organizations that support it; give more results in a short time, they start and consolidate graduates, optimizing the use of the infrastructure.
To form the group it is necessary to have good relationships among the members. So as to integrate and work in a team they must have common interests and affinities, even the researchers’ personalities are involved so collaboration can be possible. For example, agree on how the group is handled, the distribution of tasks, the acknowledgement of the authors in publishing, where the project is heading, among other facts. A university environment is more prolific for research, as well as the freedom of choosing one’s own research topics. They mention there is a good working atmosphere when they are all comfortable developing what is wanted. Their values stand out, their desire of doing something useful and new, the attitude towards research, respect, seriousness, commitment, consistency and discipline.
Researchers interact with their own groups or with external groups, national and foreign ones. The profile varies among the different departments. Half of them are consolidated researchers; the other half get together to work on a project. Although they mention the benefits of team work, this is does not happen in all the areas, some are more individualists and are supported by an external group, since according to the arguments made by a researcher, his salary depended on individual and not group performance.
2.3 Conflicts
A conflict in organizations occurs when multiple goals exist and they are in conflict; reaching one can usually be achieved at the expense of another. It is also argued that the conflict occurs because of the desired values, like security, power, survival, discretion and autonomy; as well as a series of rewards (Perrow, 1991). The conflict in this study is the struggle between the desired objectives and the restrictions set by the structure and environment. Among the conflicts that are identified are: the resources, time, regulations, bureaucracy, discretion (personal contact with persons or groups) and competition.
Resources will always imply conflict, because they are scarce, because the rules that set its distribution and participation are not compatible for all researchers, they take time to be obtained, and when they finally arrive the results must be delivered. Also, because there are more formalities every day and priorities leave out more than 50% of the researchers.4 In addition, without resources researchers hardly achieve their goals and are prevented from having greater scientific productivity, higher incentives and recognition.
On the other hand, there is the fact of the time available to do the research. This institution of higher education has three main functions and researchers who dedicate more time to one of them, reduce the dedication to the other; hence the need for sufficient time to research is one of the recurring concepts in the interviews. According to the perception of the researchers, they have an overload of work, they have many obligations, and they must not only dedicate time to research but to teaching and to management as well. They mention that teaching activities prevent, most of times, them from dedicating themselves to research, not only because its consuming, but because teaching implies other activities that are not considered officially, and that represent time, such as: preparing classes, grading tests, attending meetings about the subjects they teach, integrating with groups of professors to make the same tests, offer and at the same time take refresher courses, attend meetings the director asked them to.
It is worth noting that, even though professors have argued that giving classes is time consuming and it does not support their productivity, they also mentioned a positive aspect: the opportunity to recruit the best students for postgraduate courses and, therefore, support research projects. Also, the answers of the interviewees indicate that the problem that researchers have is not time to do several activities, but the fact that they do not want to do other activities because they do not consider them important, transcendent and, because they are not appraised within their productivity in order to increase their stimuli.
What is more, there are cases in which regulations do not apply equally for everyone, but are subject to discretion. This a prerogative that authorities have to support or not the researchers they want. Discreetness exists, and this can be a consequence of ambiguous regulations, or the lack of them, and in a centralized structure and autocracy.
The interviewee mention that conflict appears because:
- Rules do not apply equally nor are they defined in a collegiately way;
- There are no mechanisms to listen and to be heard between the authorities and faculty.
- They perceive that hiring is not done in an academic and collegiate manner, since it is done without any direction, they don’t visualize a line of work or the consolidation of research lines.
- Information does not get to professors;
- They have the responsibility and assignment of spaces, resources and students.
However, the discrete decisions can be beneficial for researchers, but can also be an affect to other. At the end, the result is not equal; it can produce distrust of all the researchers and a lack of legitimacy in decision making.
The discretion of the authorities depends on their relationships with researchers. This situation is related to the fact that the researcher can be heard and supported by the authorities, the priority given by the authorities for the type of activity that the researcher is performing, the importance the research has over other activities, like teaching. The matter is to obtain certain support which can be assumed as a favor and is given in return of something.
On the other hand, the interviewed researchers also mention that the conflict arises from competition, from professional jealousy, when there are two different ways to work and people have different values; the internal competition replaces the group’s interests.
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III. Discussion
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Although the university, object of this work, has among its functions research development, this is marginal component. This impacts its programs and curricula, its hiring mechanisms and the assignment of functions of academic personnel, the characteristics of such personnel and the resources at their disposal to carry out its main tasks.
It is perceived that institution regulations that derive from economic incentives are non-democratic, there is one feature of discretion in which the researchers perceive favoritism towards other people. In the case of regulations, the rules and statutes, this university presents obsolete and ambiguous documents that have not been updated or the institution does not want to update according to new policies that demand greater production. It shows centralization for recruitment, and discretion in the distribution of spaces, resources and time.
The results show that when trying to achieve the objectives and depending on the resources in context, researchers are limited by the restrictions set by the structure. Compliance with these requirements causes constraints within the institutions’ functioning. As stated by Scott (1998), organizations must respond simultaneously to their environments, and will have constraints if they cannot meet or control environmental demands. A way to reduce uncertainty, according to Aldrich and Pfeffer (as cited in Hall, 1996) is that organizations learn, retain organizational forms, past examples are precedents for the present, the older the institution is the more it has learn; consequently, uncertainty can be reduced. This means that the authorities as well as groups or researchers even when they work from a set of constraints identify spaces to get a position of their own. Also, there are empirical researches that mention that the lack of resources can limit academic work (Baird, 1986; Bland and Ruffin, 1992; Adair, 1995; Grediaga, 2001; Chavoya and Rivera, 2003; Parada, 2003).
Meyer and Rowan (1999) mention that organizations are structured by environmental phenomena and tend to become isomorphic with them. This means that organizations adjust to their environment through interdependence and exchange techniques; they also perform active roles in those contexts. Therefore, organizations look for authorities to grant them certain privileges and seek the institutionalization of their objectives and structures in the rules of those authorities.
For Meyer and Rowan (1991), organizations that exist in complex institutional environments and have success in turning these environments isomorphs, they obtain legitimacy and the resources that are required for surviving. In part, it depends on the environmental processes and the capacity of determining organizational leaderships to adapt these processes. In complex institutional environments leadership is required to understand the changing preferences and governmental programs. But this kind of conformity and almost guaranteed survival that accompanies it is only possible in an environment with a very institutional structure. Such is the case of the university, which has adapted to the environment and has institutionalized lots of successful practices in the past.
The theory demonstrates that a relationship between the structure and organizational behavior exists, one influences the other and vice versa. The conjunction of restrictions that direct behavior can be observed in the results, in their regulations and administrative procedures. Researchers perceive it as a barrier that obstructs their research. The administrative work, teaching, ambiguous and obsolete regulations do of their job more a heavier burden. This is also argued in empirical researches like that of Sharobean and Howard (2002), in which they mention that administrative commitments, committees and teaching duties impede research productivity. Likewise, Chavoya and Rivera (2003) discuss that the consequence of a parallel performance in administration and in research results in a low productivity, which affects the entry and continuance of researchers in SNI. It is also argued that bureaucracy affects scientific production negatively (Cheng and McKinley, 1983; Chavoya and Rivera, 2003; Adair, 1995).
In the case of organizational behavior, consolidated and emerging groups can be observed and the formation of the current academic body. These academic bodies are formed by the authority’s initiative, according to what some interviewees mentioned there are many of academic bodies which only exist on paper. Also, among the research groups there are conflicts arising from the internal competition and from professional jealousy, and territoriality.
Behavior in the institution comes from alternate controls (just as March and Simon mentioned (as cited in Perrow, 1991) that result less visible and more effective because they are submitted to periodic evaluations of competence and performance. Acknowledgement functions as a group sanction to individual academic trajectories. There is a loose link between beliefs and choices, among problems and solutions (Weick, 1976).
Crane (1969), Mulkay (1977), Hagstrom (1964), De León (1996), Creamer (1999), Rey-Rocha, Martín Sempere and Garzón-García (2002), Arechavala and Díaz (1996), Bland and Ruffin (1992) and Adair (1995) argue that research groups, their integration, external collaboration and consolidation influence scientific productivity. The collaboration involves the combination of experts from various institutions to overcome limitations, like the lack of a critical mass, not only among researchers but teams also. This offers the opportunity to professors and the institutions of participating in transcendental research that they would not be able to carry out successfully by themselves. However, the collaboration is a strategy that takes a considerable amount of time and effort to be implemented. It requires the construction of information and communication connections, where none of them may have existed before. It requires negotiation, confidence and a positive perspective (Feller, 2000).
Likewise, Adair (1995), Bland and Ruffin (1992) state professional interactions, communication and leadership affect scientific productivity. Partnerships can create an exceptional environment for research productivity, if managed effectively. When these interactions occur, researchers are capable of tolerating the ambiguity, negotiating clearly, communicating openly and resolving all problems quickly (Veigel, 2000).
Conflicts arise from regulations and organizational behavior. It is a struggle between personal objectives and the restrictions of the organization. Certain strategies of development that allow researchers and institutions to achieve their goals which can be developed taking advantage of the regulations’ gaps, lagoons and interpretation.
Meyer and Rowan (1999) state organizations cannot formally coordinate activities, because their formal rules, if implemented, would create inconsistencies. Therefore, they let individuals to develop interdependence techniques informally, that is to say, to get along with other people. The assumption that formal structures are working really protects from inconsistencies and anomalies that involve technical activities. Also, how integration is avoided, disputes are minimized and conflicts and organization can win support of a wide range of persons and external components.
Thus, having a formal structure lets organizations maintain legitimizing structures, while their activities vary in response to practical considerations. March and Simon (as cited in Meyer and Rowan, 1999), state that the delegation, the professionalization, the goal ambiguity and maintaining prestige, are mechanisms to eliminate uncertainty; while, the organization’s formal structure is preserved.
In this manner, it can be appreciated that the integration and collaboration at the university where this study took place, vary in response to each one of them, minimizing disputes and conflicts like uncertainty.
The Conflict Theory has its origin with Marx (as cited in Perrow, 1991) who recognizes that organizations are systems of power or domination. This theory emphasizes that each participant has its own interests and values, which can enter in conflict with the organization (Scott, 1998). March and Simon (as cited in Perrow, 1991) mention that they are focused when multiple tasks exists and are in conflict. The result is a continuous process of learning and negotiating. At this point many tasks can enter in conflict, which have to be done at the same time, like teaching, research, management, tutoring, administration, and etcetera.
Cyert and March (as cited in Perrow, 1991) define organizations as complex systems for individuals and coalitions, each one with its own interests, beliefs and values, preferences, perspectives and perceptions. These coalitions continuously compete among themselves for scarce organization resources. DiMaggio and Powell (1999), state that the creation and execution of institutional agreements are plagued with conflicts, contradictions and ambiguities. It is here where the relevant roll is identified, the standards charged and valued. The dominance of one group over another will be defined by the decisions that in each case are chosen.
Fairweather (2002), Levitan and Ray (1992), Hu and Gill (2000), Buchheit, Collins and Collins (2001), Tanner, Totaro and Hotard (1999), Green, Hutchison and Sar (1992), Hancock, Lane, Ray and Glennon (1992), Sharobeam and Howard (2002) and Pham (2000) state that there is an inverse relationship among professor with a high load, with respect to productivity. Also, Chavoya and Rivera (2003), argue that the rigidness of conception of teaching causes problems in time, which researchers would need to research.
The teaching process is conceived as hours in front of a group, including tutoring, reading of the work, the elaboration of didactic materials that the teaching process requires and that lots times does not even realize it. The researcher has to prepare opinions on projects, participate in different committees not only inside but outside of the institution arbitrate papers, publish, participate in juries, participate in counseling and committees, etcetera. Therefore, the two activities limit scientific productivity. In this sense, Pham (2000) mentioned that the lack of time can harm or damage research activities.
Hiring policies both in academics as in administrative can be disrupted by the struggle of power (preserves of power). There is a struggle to secure power. Groups are formed (informal) because the groups can mobilize more resources, obtain loyalty and configure perceptions (Perrow, 1991). Groups also fight for prestige, there is competition and academics fight to obtain it. In group struggles, Cyert and March (Perrow, 1991), highlight that some key mechanisms like the budget, describe it as an explicit development of prior commitments, that stabilizes negotiations and expectations during a year or more.
Groups agree to abide, generally, by the rules of the game, until they can try to expand their own goals in the next budget (Perrow, 1991). This also results true when testing other dominant groups that have greater budgets; they are the ones that fight for resources and for the acknowledgement of their prestige.
The institutions do not operate exclusively in function of the apparent decisions of their directors, but also, largely, by forces that set it from the exterior. Forming a part of a set of interactions, in which mutual expectations and the exchange of resources established defined patterns (Arechavala, 2003).
Grediaga (2001), state that the performance of an academic life does not depend on the recruitment time, but, largely, in stability conditions and the moment in which this was obtained. A too early stability, to some extent, acts as a productivity detractor of productivity, as the popular saying goes, sitting on his laurels. But the lack of stability in a prolonged way, also produces a negative effect for the development of a complex and productive academic life. The incentives can generate en researchers, despite the existence of definitive contracts, a sensation of instability that would affect the necessary conditions for the development of collegial life and the production of results generated in the process by a long-range systematic research.
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IV. Conclusions
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There are institutional logics, processes and structures that intervene in the efficiency of any organization. The roll that the rules have in the behavior of the individual and carrying out the tasks provides cracks (loopholes) and lagoons (blackouts) in their interpretation, where certain strategies can achieve the development that not only researchers but the institution reaches their objectives. These institutional rules are combined with conflict; an inevitable part in every organizational and human process, and arises from competition, from the multiplicity of goals, from centralization, from the little trust among directives and from the coalitions that are formed in which every one of them has their own interests, beliefs and values. The result will be a continuous process in learning and negotiation. This decision process will involve a rearrangement in structures, functions and behavior of the researchers.
Despite that restrictions exist both in the institutional part, as in the environment, coupled with the internal conflicts on behalf of the researcher and the institution through specific strategies can increase competition in research. These strategies are conditioned by a set of forces that affect the external environment, in which all universities and institutions compete for research funding. One of these strategies, according to Fuller (2000), should be made in consensus among all researchers, and it must seek factors that increase research productivity. These factors include having a body of productive researchers, with competitive levels of salary and teaching load; high quality in masters students, infrastructure in equipment, libraries, and research facilities, flexible organizational arrangements and institutional policies (in shopping, management and travel); and a central administration that supports the research. The strategy means, that despite all the restrictions mentioned, it focuses its attention and resources towards an objective. The objective considered at this point is to increase productivity then the decisions taken should contribute to its realization. Having a institutional strategy to enhance productivity must be more effective than not having it; but if it is, it is not guarantee that you will get the desired objective (Feller, 2000).
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Metlich, A. I. (2009). Institutional restrictions on scientific productivity: the case study of a Mexican public university. Revista Electrónica de Investigación Educativa, 11 (1). Retrieved month day, year, from: http://redie.uabc.mx/vol13no2/contenido-contenido.html
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Translator: Eleonora Lozano Bachioqui
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